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STATE DEBTS & 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
JOHN V. ORTH* 
 
For dryness and technicality no subject can rival public finance, 
except perhaps federal jurisdiction.1 
 
It is perhaps fitting to begin an article on sovereign debtors and 
their creditors with Ebenezer Scrooge, “a squeezing, wrenching, 
grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous old sinner.”2 On a certain 
Christmas Eve in the early 1840s, the miser was visited by the ghost of 
his former business partner, Jacob Marley, dragging a chain made of 
“cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and heavy purses wrought 
in steel.”3 Hoping to help Scrooge free himself from similar bondage, 
Marley announced that he had arranged for Scrooge to be haunted by 
three spirits. Although the old sinner fell asleep well after midnight, 
he was awakened by the sound of midnight chimes. At first, Scrooge 
feared that he had slept through a day on which the sun had failed to 
rise and that his time-sensitive securities had become worthless. When 
he realized that the city was not gripped by panic and that it was still 
the night of the same day, he heaved a great sigh of relief “because 
‘three days after sight of this First of Exchange pay to Mr. Ebenezer 
Scrooge or his order,’ and so forth, would have become a mere United 
 
* William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B. 
1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. (history) 1977, Harvard University. 
 1.  JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY viii (1987). 
 2.  CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 8 (New Oxford Illustrated Dickens 1954) 
(1843). 
 3.  Id. at 17. 
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States’ security if there were no days to count by.”4 
Due to the reckless financiering that ended in the Panic of 1837 
and the ensuing default by a number of American states, American 
government debt had become a byword for worthlessness. What we 
today would recognize as a true “United States’ security”—a treasury 
bill or note backed by the full faith and credit of the federal 
government—had not become worthless. Indeed after 1835, when the 
federal government paid off the first national debt in full, such truly 
federal securities no longer existed. Scrooge (and many Englishmen 
with him) had failed to understand the structure of American 
government and public finance and had confused Pennsylvania and 
other state bonds with federal obligations. Just as the introduction of 
the Euro in 1999 led investors to believe that the shared currency 
made the debts of Europe’s peripheral economies just as safe as 
German bunds, so English investors a hundred and sixty years earlier 
had mispriced the various American state debts. There are no 
Eurobonds (yet), so a modern equivalent to Scrooge’s metaphor 
would be as if Scrooge had called Greek bonds “a mere European 
security”—likening junk to what would presumably be (if it existed) a 
triple-A rated obligation. 
State bonds are not “fiat money,” as economists use that term, but 
they share at least one characteristic with unsecured paper currency: 
they depend for their legal value on judicial power to enforce them. 
Would American courts enforce the bonds of the defaulting American 
states? That was the question English investors asked their lawyers. 
State courts were an unpromising venue because of the recognized 
power of states to invoke sovereign immunity and close their own 
courts to suitors. Ironically, one of the indebted states did allow suits 
against itself. Mississippi allowed suit, a case was duly brought, and 
the plaintiffs won.5 But the judgment went unsatisfied, and one of the 
 
 4.  Id. at 23. At the time, bills of exchange were “prepared in three sets as the first, 
second, and third exchange, so that if one was lost, the others would be available, and once one 
[was] accepted the others [became] worthless.” CHARLES DICKENS, THE ANNOTATED 
CHRISTMAS CAROL 84 (Michael Patrick Hearn ed. 1976). Dickens had alluded to the subject of 
American repudiation in his travelogue, AMERICAN NOTES, published in 1842, and returned to 
the subject several times in MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT, a long novel that was being published in 
serial form at the same time as the publication of A CHRISTMAS CAROL. CHARLES DICKENS, 
AMERICAN NOTES 245–46 (New Oxford Illustrated Dickens 1957) (1842); CHARLES DICKENS, 
THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 374, 531, 537 (New Oxford Illustrated 
Dickens 1951) (1843–44). 
 5.  See generally State v. Johnson, 25 Miss. 625 (1853) (holding that under the constitution 
and laws of Mississippi a bondholder could sue the state and recover the amount of principal 
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judges was defeated at the next election.6 
I.  THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: THE EARLY YEARS 
The availability of federal courts to enforce state bonds depended 
on the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Adopted in 
1795 to overturn an earlier Supreme Court decision holding that 
federal courts had jurisdiction over a suit to collect a state debt 
brought by a citizen of another state,7 the Amendment was a response 
to fear that domestic and foreign creditors could invoke federal 
jurisdiction to enforce state obligations.8 The Eleventh Amendment 
neatly eliminated that risk: “The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, [and then added for good measure] or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”9 Bond-holding British 
subjects appeared to be shut out. 
 
 
and interest of the bond). 
 6.  REGINALD MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 218 
(Beard Books 2000). Mississippi was the first state to provide for the popular election of all its 
judges. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 127 (2d ed. 1986); see MISS. 
CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 2 (“The high court of errors and appeals shall consist of three judges, 
any two of whom shall form a quorum. The legislature shall divide the State into three districts, 
and the qualified electors of each district shall elect one of the said judges for the term of six 
years.”). 
 7.  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 425 (1793). As adopted in 1789, the Constitution 
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies . . . between a State and citizens of 
another State.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Chisholm was heard in the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, 
the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”). Officially recognized by presidential 
proclamation as part of the Constitution on January 8, 1798, the date traditionally given for its 
adoption, the Eleventh Amendment had in fact received the necessary number of state 
ratifications by February 7, 1795. 
 8.  See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406–07 (1821) (“It is part of our 
history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the 
apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious 
objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the Court maintained its jurisdiction. 
The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained, 
this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State legislatures.”); see also 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999) (“It is indisputable that, at the time of the founding, 
many of the States could have been forced into insolvency but for their immunity from private 
suits for money damages.”). 
 9.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For an argument that the Eleventh Amendment is a judicial 
decision in the form of a constitutional amendment, see John V. Orth, The Judicial Amendment, 
37 J. SUP. CT. HIST. (forthcoming 2012). 
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Viewed through the gimlet eye of a litigator, however, the wording 
of the Amendment suggested interesting possibilities. Although it 
closed the federal courthouse door to suits against states by two 
classes of plaintiffs—citizens of a state other than the defendant state 
and citizens (or subjects) of foreign states—it did not exhaust the 
universe of potential suitors. The obvious lacuna in the Amendment 
was a suit by a citizen of the debtor state. If citizens could use the 
federal courts to collect from their own state, it would establish a 
market for the bonds and give foreign bondholders leverage in 
negotiations with the debtor state.10 The Supreme Court closed this 
loophole in a decision that recognized a federal right to state 
sovereign immunity in such a case11—but not until 1890, when another 
wave of state defaults after the Civil War and another financial panic 
generated the mushroom growth of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence.12 
Another possibility was suit by a foreign state itself (as opposed to 
its citizens or subjects). In 1844, the year after the publication of 
Dickens’s A CHRISTMAS CAROL, the prominent Massachusetts 
lawyer, Benjamin Curtis (later a U.S. Supreme Court Justice), acting 
on behalf of Baring Brothers, published an anonymous article in the 
influential North American Review suggesting just such a strategy.13 
Sovereigns have always taken an interest in the security of their 
citizens’ foreign investments, sometimes forcibly. Sending the 
gunboats was out of the question in this case, but sending the lawyers 
might have been possible. This suggestion too was acted upon—but 
 
 10.  Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 122 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[N]othing 
in the treaty [of Paris, 1783] would have prevented foreign creditors from selling their debt 
instruments (thereby assigning their claims) to citizens of the debtor State.”). The Assignee 
Clause of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 excluded from the diversity jurisdiction of lower 
federal courts “any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action 
in favour of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such courts to recover the 
said contents if no assignment had been made.” Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 
Stat. 73, 79. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court held that the clause was not applicable to 
securities like bearer bonds that pass by delivery, not assignment. See, e.g., Thomson v. Lee 
County, 70 U.S. 327 (1866) (holding that if a state court construes its laws and constitution to 
give the bonds force and vitality, the Supreme Court cannot destroy them by a subsequent and 
contrary construction). 
 11.  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 12.  See ORTH, supra note 1, at 58–109 (describing the history of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 13.  Benjamin R. Curtis, Debts of the American States, 58 N. AM. REV. 109 (1844). Notably, 
John Marshall had pointed the way in dicta more than twenty years earlier. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) at 406 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “does not comprehend 
controversies . . . between a State and a foreign State”). 
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not for another hundred years. In 1934, the Principality of Monaco 
sued Mississippi in the Supreme Court on its defaulted 1830s bonds 
with no greater success than in the case of the in-state plaintiff.14 
Yet another possibility was assignment to an American state (as 
opposed to its citizens) for collection.15 This was tried—also many 
years later—but met with only mixed success.16 The one surefire 
winner would have been suit by the United States government.17 
Whether efforts were made in this direction in the 1840s is unknown. 
There might have been reason to hope: the reputational damage to 
American credit by the state defaults affected even the federal fisc, 
which was denied the possibility of a foreign loan in 1842. “Not a 
dollar,” said Baron Rothschild to the Treasury’s agent.18 Political 
constraints imposed by sectionalism probably made federal action 
infeasible.19 
It was also possible to approach the problem from the other end, 
so to speak. Rather than trying to find the right plaintiff, why not try a 
different defendant? Rather than sue the state itself, why not sue a 
state officer—say, the state auditor—to compel payment? The 
Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall had allowed just 
such a strategy in a suit by the Bank of the United States to recover 
an unconstitutional state tax collected on one of its branches.20 “[I]n 
all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party,” said the Chief 
Justice, “it is the party named in the record.”21 A state officer is not a 
 
 14.  Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
 15. Again, John Marshall had signposted the way. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406 
(explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “does not comprehend controversies between two or 
more States”). 
 16.  See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (asserting jurisdiction and 
distinguishing New Hampshire v. Lousiana on the ground that New Hampshire had bare legal 
title, while South Dakota was asserting its own beneficial ownership); New Hampshire v. 
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (denying jurisdiction); see also Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 
290 (1907) (asserting jurisdiction over the dispute concerning the two states’ liabilities for their 
respective portions of the antebellum Virginia state debt). 
 17.  See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (involving a suit by the United 
States to determine the boundary between U.S. land and land belonging to Texas); United 
States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1890) (involving a suit by the United States against 
North Carolina to recover interest on bonds issued by the state). 
 18.  Letter from Duff Green to John C. Calhoun (Jan. 24, 1842), reprinted in 2 AM. HIST. 
ASS’N REP. 841, 842 (1899); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER SENT TO EUROPE TO 
NEGOTIATE A LOAN, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-197 (3d Sess. 1843). 
 19.  For a discussion, see Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism is Not Europe’s. It’s Becoming 
Argentina’s., 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 17 (2012). 
 20.  Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
 21.  Id. at 857. 
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state. A suit against a state officer is, therefore, not a suit against a 
state. Q.E.D. Years later, bondholders tried this route around the 
Eleventh Amendment, at first with promising results. But finally this, 
too, turned out to be a dead end.22 
However many of these legal strategies the state creditors 
considered in the 1840s, the one thing they did not consider was to sue 
the debtor states in federal court. Accordingly, the exact bearing of 
the Eleventh Amendment on American state debt was left 
undetermined for decades. In fact, also left open was the question to 
what extent state debts were properly sovereign debts at all 
(assuming, that is, that a defining characteristic of sovereign debts is 
their uncollectibility by ordinary legal means).23 In the 1840s, the 
creditors’ legal situation was not unpromising. Chief Justice Marshall, 
as we have seen, showed no enthusiasm for the Eleventh Amendment, 
and Chief Justice Roger Taney never had to take a position on the 
Amendment during his long tenure.24 Despite their many differences, 
both men were firm believers in the reach of federal jurisdiction. Of 
course, there are many reasons aggrieved parties decide not to litigate 
other than doubts about jurisdiction: the cost in time and money 
relative to the likelihood of recovery, their lawyers’ skill (or lack 
thereof) in devising plausible legal arguments, and the chance for an 
acceptable settlement. In the case of the creditors of the states in the 
1840s, the reason seems to have been the prospect of settlements. 
Many of the antebellum state debts were at least partially redeemed.25 
 
 22.  Compare Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203, 220 (1873) (allowing suit against a state governor, 
holding that “[w]here the State is concerned, the State should be made a party, if it could be 
done. That it cannot be done is a sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may 
proceed to decree against the officers of the State in all respects as if the State were a party to 
the record.”), and Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876) (allowing suit against a 
state board), with Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883) (denying jurisdiction 
over suit against a state auditor), and North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890) (denying 
jurisdiction over suit against a state auditor). 
 23.  See William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State 
Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 259 (1996) (“These debts are properly seen as 
sovereign debts both because the United States Constitution precludes suits against states to 
enforce the payment of debts, and because most of the state debts were held by residents of 
other states and other countries (primarily Britain).”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 464 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Forgotten Books 2008) (“The contracts between a nation and an 
individual are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a 
compulsive force. They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will.”). 
 24.  See ORTH, supra note 1, at 42 (“The Amendment was cited in only five cases [during 
Taney’s tenure as Chief Justice] and in none did the Court find itself ousted of jurisdiction.”). 
 25.  See English, supra note 23, at 265 (outlining debts and outcomes in table 3). 
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II. STATE DEBT IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
When the next wave of American sovereign defaults hit the 
capital markets in the 1880s, the disappointed bondholders launched a 
vigorous campaign of litigation, perhaps because the prospect of 
settlement seemed remote under the circumstances.26 The result was 
scant recovery and a remarkable extension of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, important parts of which survived the later revanche of 
federal power—indeed, survive to this day.27 By 1890, precedents had 
accumulated barring suits to collect state debts brought against state 
officers, against states by other states, and against states by their own 
citizens.28 
The political realities of post-Reconstruction America are more 
important than legal analysis in making sense of this sudden 
efflorescence of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. To paraphrase 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, experience rather than logic was the 
life of the Eleventh Amendment.29 It is the common coin of American 
constitutional history that Supreme Court Justices in the late-
nineteenth century were unsurpassed in their zeal for freedom of 
contract and the protection of property.30 Repudiation must have 
stunk in their nostrils. 
The cases in which the Court stretched the Eleventh Amendment 
to prevent suits against states all involved suits against states of the 
Old Confederacy, principally Louisiana and North Carolina.31 By the 
time the litigation commenced, Reconstruction was over, the South 
had recovered “home rule” (that is, rule by the indigenous white male 
population), and the U.S. Army had been sent back to barracks. Just 
as the President and Congress abandoned the newly freed slaves after 
 
 26.  ORTH, supra note 1, at 53–55, 59–60, 63–66, and 90–92 (describing litigation in the 
1880s). 
 27.  See discussion infra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. 
 28.  The rejection of suits by foreign sovereigns had to wait several more decades. 
 29.  Cf. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881) (“The life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience.”). 
 30.  See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
ATTITUDES OF BAR & BENCH, 1887–1895 (1960) (providing an historical account of legal 
doctrines used by courts to preserve particular property rights and contractual obligations). 
 31.  Lest there be any confusion, I should make clear that the repudiated bonds in question 
were issued by the Confederate States of America or by its constituent states. The Fourteenth 
Amendment made “any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States” illegal and void. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. Instead, the bondholders 
were trying to enforce bonds authorized by Reconstruction legislatures. See, e.g., Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890). Or, in some cases, by antebellum legislatures. See, e.g., North 
Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890). 
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Reconstruction, so perforce the former slaves were abandoned by the 
federal courts.32 Investors in Southern bonds were abandoned too—
and for the same reason. As the attorney general of Louisiana 
candidly pointed out to the Supreme Court in 1890: 
The solemn obligation of a government arising on its own 
acknowledged bond would not be enhanced by a judgment 
rendered on such bond. If it either could not or would not make 
provision for paying the bond, it is probable that it could not or 
would not make provision for satisfying the judgment.33 
Without the backing of the political branches, in other words, the 
courts could not expect their judgments to be satisfied. 
The difficulty with that simple solution was that Virginia—
arguably the most important state of the Old Confederacy—was 
denied the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment. A study of the cases 
shows that the difference resulted from a unique provision included in 
the covenants of the Virginia bonds, rather than any inherent 
difference in Virginia’s sovereign immunity: the coupons representing 
the periodic interest payments were made “receivable at and after 
maturity for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the state.”34 Again, 
Chief Justice Marshall provided the clue. In an early case raising an 
Eleventh Amendment claim, Chief Justice Marshall asked: “Were a 
State to lay [an unconstitutional] duty on exports,35 to collect the 
money and place it in her treasury, could the citizen who paid it . . . 
maintain a suit in this Court against such a State, to recover back the 
money?”36 Answering his question with a dubious “[p]erhaps not,” he 
continued: 
 
 32.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (holding unconstitutional major 
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875). 
 33.  Brief on behalf of the State of Louisiana at 25, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) 
(quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Baring Bros. & Co. (Oct. 16, 1839), reprinted in THE 
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: CORRESPONDENCE, VOL. 4: 1835–1839, at 407 (Charles M. 
Wiltse & Howard D. Moser eds., 1980)). For a brief discussion of Webster’s rather confusing 
opinion letter, see ORTH, supra note 1, at 43–44. It is one thing for a lawyer to advise a client 
that a judgment debtor might refuse to pay; it is something else for a debtor’s advocate to tell a 
court, as a reason not to issue a judgment in favor of the creditor, that such debtor might refuse 
to pay. 
 34.  Act of March 30, 1871, ch. 282, § 2, 1870–1871 Va. Acts 378, 379. 
 35.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid 
by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; 
and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.”). 
 36.  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 402 (1821). 
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Suppose a citizen to refuse to pay this export duty, and a suit to be 
instituted for the purpose of compelling him to pay it. He pleads 
the constitution of the United States in bar of the action, 
notwithstanding which the [trial] Court gives judgment against 
him. This would be a case arising under the constitution37 
—in other words, a justiciable case.38 
As applied to the Virginia coupons, this suggested a different legal 
strategy. Rather than sue the state (or its officers) to compel payment, 
a bondholder could tender matured coupons in satisfaction of state 
taxes. To avoid its “solemn obligation,” the state would then have to 
sue the taxpayer for taxes due and unpaid. Such a suit was quite 
obviously not a suit against a state, and a judicial decision that the 
taxes had been legally discharged would not require the court to 
order the state to make “any provision for satisfying the judgment.” 
Tender of payment by a debtor at a reasonable time and place and in 
a reasonable manner is sufficient to satisfy a debt or obligation, 
whether or not the creditor accepts the payment. In this case, the trial 
court’s judgment would be self-executing. Taxes are paid when a court 
of competent jurisdiction says they are. Ipse dixit. This strategy was 
tried and, after much litigation, finally succeeded.39 
There was also another class of government debt that was not 
exempted from federal jurisdiction. In the Midwest and West, cities 
and counties had issued bonds or pledged their credit to encourage 
railroad construction. In the same year that the Southern states 
(except Virginia) got their quittance, the Supreme Court held that 
municipal corporations were not alter egos of the state and were 
therefore denied the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment.40 Quoting 
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court smugly announced: “[T]he eleventh 
 
 37. Id. at 402–03. Marshall had posed the same hypothetical case almost twenty years 
earlier in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). See also Hans, 134 U.S. at 20–
21 (“Whilst a State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part 
to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially resisted, and any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and 
powerless to affect their enjoyment.”). 
 38.  Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383 (“[A] case arising under the constitution or laws of 
the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that 
case.”). 
 39.  E.g., McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 664–65 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507–
08 (1887); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 269–70 (1885); Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 
769, 782 (1883); Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S. 672, 685 (1881). For the colorful history of 
Virginia’s determined effort to “readjust” its debt, including statutes commonly known as 
“coupon killers,” see ORTH, supra note 1, 90–105. 
 40.  Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). 
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amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the 
constitution over suits against states, is of necessity limited to those 
suits in which the state is a party on the record.”41 Cities and counties 
are not states, despite the fact that they derive all their powers—
including the power to borrow—from the state. This time, the political 
branches showed their resolve to back up the courts. Ulysses S. Grant, 
war hero and President, permitted the publication of a letter stating 
that he would not hesitate to use force if necessary to see that county 
debts were honored.42 In modern terminology, municipal debt is not 
sovereign; it is subsovereign, which is merely another way of saying 
that legal means are available to enforce payment. Today, of course, 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code offers a mechanism for orderly 
municipal defaults.43 
III. EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY APPROACHES  
TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
As the problem of Southern state bonds receded into the past, the 
Supreme Court began the slow process of withdrawing from a few of 
its more extreme Eleventh Amendment positions. In 1904, a suit by 
one state against another (and a Southern state at that) to collect on 
defaulted bonds was allowed.44 In 1908, the most significant 
retrenchment occurred. Distinguishing several of the bond cases, the 
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against a 
state officer to prevent violation of the Federal Constitution.45 
Although the Court found that unconstitutional state action was 
 
 41.  Id. (quoting Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824)); see also Bank 
of U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 905–06 (1824) (holding that a state-
chartered bank is not an alter ego of the state and therefore not eligible to claim Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). Although cities and counties are in fact organs of state government, 
they are, in form, chartered corporations. Traditionally, corporations were divided into 
“municipal corporations” and “corporations other than municipal.” E.g., N.C. CONST. of 1868, 
arts. VII, VIII; see JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION, 140–43 
(1993). 
 42.  Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to John A. Dix (June 20, 1870), reprinted in CHARLES 
FAIRMAN, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION 
AND REUNION 1864–88, PART ONE, at 985 (Paul A. Freund ed. 1971). 
 43.  See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Imp. Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 543 (1936) (“In the 
public law of the United States a State is a sovereign or at least a quasi-sovereign. Not so, a local 
governmental unit, although the State may have invested it with governmental power.”). 
 44.  South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 313–14 (1904); see generally ROBERT F. 
DURDEN, RECONSTRUCTION BONDS AND TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICS: SOUTH DAKOTA V. 
NORTH CAROLINA (1904) (1962) (recounting the political and legal controversy surrounding the 
“South Dakota bond” case). 
 45.  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). 
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threatened, it nonetheless held that the officer through whom the 
state acted could not assert the state’s sovereign immunity. By 
attempting to enforce an unconstitutional statute, the state officer is 
“stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in 
his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.”46 As the 
Supreme Court itself later acknowledged, this holding had the ironical 
result that a state officer’s conduct is state action for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but not for purposes of the Eleventh 
Amendment.47 Over the course of the twentieth century, that line has 
wavered but held at the point that exceptions to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity are permitted insofar as “necessary to permit 
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials 
responsible to ‘the supreme authority of the United States.’”48 
IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN THE 
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Eleventh 
Amendment again emerged from obscurity as an activist federal 
government encountered state concern about liability, and Supreme 
Court Justices representing different political tendencies disagreed 
(often forcefully) about the extent of state sovereign immunity.49 At 
one time it appeared that the legacy of the Southern bond cases 
would be limited to preventing judgments against state officers that 
required drawing money from the state treasury.50 But this possibility 
was negatived in 1996 by the categorical holding in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida:51 “[T]he relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is 
irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.”52 
Seminole Tribe involved what Justice John Paul Stevens aptly 
called the “rather curious” provision in the Indian Gaming 
 
 46.  Id. at 160. 
 47.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984). 
 48.  Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160). 
 49.  See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 292 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as a “hodgepodge” of “ad hoc and unmanageable rules 
bearing little or no relation to one another or to any coherent framework”); Halderman, 465 
U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s application of Eleventh 
Amendment as “perverse”). 
 50.  Papasan, 478 U.S. at 276–77; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). 
 51.  517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 52.  Id. at 58. 
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Regulatory Act. First, the provision required states to negotiate in 
good faith with Indian tribes over the regulation of gambling on their 
reservations. Second, the provision authorized the tribes to sue the 
states in federal court if they did not.53 The legal issue was whether 
Congress could authorize such suits. The majority, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that it could not: “The Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida 
capable of being sued in federal court.”54 For authority the Court 
relied on one of the Southern bond cases from 1890, Hans v. 
Louisiana.55 In Hans, an in-state plaintiff had sued his own state—the 
same case in which the state attorney general had warned the Court 
concerning the difficulty of enforcing a judgment against the state.56 
The Court in Hans found as a historical fact that the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment evidenced an original understanding, broader 
than the literal terms of the Amendment, that states were not subject 
to suit in federal court without their consent.57 It therefore dismissed 
the suit for want of jurisdiction.58 In Seminole Tribe, the plaintiff tribe 
had also joined the state’s governor as a defendant, but the majority 
rejected this claim, too, inferring that Congress did not contemplate 
jurisdiction over a state officer because the legislation prescribed “a 
 
 53.  Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54.  Id. at 76. Despite this sweeping statement, the Chief Justice elsewhere in his opinion 
recognized that Congress did have the power to make a state susceptible to suit in federal court 
if acting pursuant to its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 59 (citing 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). 
 55.  134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 56.  See Hans, 134 U.S. at 9 (“The question is presented, whether a State can be sued in a 
Circuit Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon a suggestion that the case is 
one that arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”). 
 57.  See id. at 15 (“Can we suppose that, when the eleventh amendment was adopted, it was 
understood to be left open for citizens of a state to sue their own state in the federal courts, 
while the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?   
. . . The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.”). 
 58.  I have not discussed the issue of state consent to suit in this paper, although it is 
germane to the general issue of federal jurisdiction over states. Despite holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment and the associated concept of state sovereign immunity deprive federal 
courts of jurisdiction over suits against states, the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over suits against states that consent. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (“[A] State 
may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.”). State consent to suit is the unique 
instance in which a party may confer jurisdiction on the Court. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 127–28 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[C]onsent of a party is in all other instances 
wholly insufficient to create subject-matter jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist.”). 
Since the question here is whether state debts are sovereign, I have limited my remarks to cases 
in which consent to suit is denied. 
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detailed remedial scheme” in case a state refused to comply.59 
Justice David Souter, writing on behalf of three other Justices, 
filed a long dissenting opinion, extensively reviewing the historical 
literature.60 Turning the history lesson against the majority, Justice 
Souter wrote that “Hans is so utterly indefensible on the merits of its 
legal analysis that one is forced to look elsewhere in order to 
understand how the Court could have gone so far wrong.”61 
“[H]istory,” he said, “provides the explanation,”62 and pointed to “the 
pattern of the cases, which tends to show that the presence or absence 
of enforcement difficulties significantly influenced the path of the law 
in this area.”63 Thus, Justice Souter would have limited Hans to cases 
brought under the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over suits 
involving states and citizens of another state (so-called “citizen-state 
diversity jurisdiction”).64 For cases against a state arising under the 
Constitution (“federal question jurisdiction”),65 state sovereign 
immunity would exist as only a matter of federal common law, 
waivable by congressional legislation. 
Seemingly irked, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that the 
dissent “disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together 
from law review articles and its own version of historical events” and 
concluded that “[i]ts undocumented and highly speculative extralegal 
explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the Court’s 
traditional method of adjudication.”66 While the Chief Justice may 
 
 59.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (majority opinion). Under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, the remedy for failure by a state to negotiate in good faith is an order directing 
the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days. The remedy for failure to 
comply with this order is an order that each party submit a proposed compact to a mediator who 
selects the one that best embodies the terms of the statute. Finally, the remedy for failure by a 
state to accept the compact selected by the mediator is notice to the Secretary of the Interior 
who then implements regulations governing gambling on the tribal lands. Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2012). 
 60.  The historical literature included (I must admit) my book and later law review article. 
See ORTH, supra note 1 (tracing the history of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence); John V. 
Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, 73 N.C. L. REV. 255 
(1994) (discussing misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Justice Iredell’s dissent). 
 61.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 122 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 62.  Id. at 120; see also id. at 122 (“[H]istory explains, but does not honor, Hans.”). 
 63.  Id. at 121 n.16. 
 64.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . 
between a State and Citizens of another State . . . .”). 
 65.  See id. (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority . . . .”). 
 66.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68–69; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
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have a point about the explanation being “extralegal,” in the sense 
that it is not based on what appears in the U.S. Reports (and perhaps 
about its “speculative” nature, based as it is on “the pattern of the 
cases”), he overstates his point about the forensic use of history. The 
Court in Hans—like the Court in many other constitutional cases—
purported to base its decision on “its own version of historical 
events.”67 As Justice Souter justly observed in reply, “[t]his Court’s 
opinions frequently make assertions of historical fact,” although he 
qualified this observation with the recognition that “these assertions 
are not authoritative as to history in the same way that our 
interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them.”68 
Although the majority readily acknowledged the historical 
context of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, it refused to 
consider the historical context of the decision in Hans. Perhaps this is 
what the Chief Justice meant by “the Court’s traditional method of 
adjudication.” Although it is characteristic of forensic legal history to 
treat historical facts as relevant to the understanding of legal 
documents such as statutes or constitutions (or constitutional 
amendments), judges tend to treat judicial decisions as ahistorical, 
perhaps because to emphasize the particular historical context of a 
decision would detract from the appearance of judicial impartiality. 
Supreme Court cases are not adjudications of historical fact. (In 
this country we are fortunately spared an official history.) Whether or 
not the Court in Hans found its version of the past merely a 
convenient explanation for dismissing a case it could not handle for 
other reasons, the decision it rendered was an interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment—or, rather of Article III of the Constitution, in 
light of the Eleventh Amendment. The dissenters in Seminole Tribe 
thought Hans was wrong as a matter of constitutional construction. It 
is certainly plausible to argue that they found historical arguments 
convenient as a way to marginalize a decision with which they 
 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) (referring to “the now-fashionable 
revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth in other opinions in a degree of 
repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods”). 
 67.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68–69. 
 68.  Id. at 108 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is also worth noting the riposte by Chief Justice 
Appleton of Maine to Chief Justice Taney’s use of history in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 
(1856): “[W]hatever may be the authoritative force of a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, there can be no doubt that its statements, as to the past history of the country, are 
binding neither on the historian nor the jurist.” Burton v. Kennebec, 44 Me. 405, 561 (1857). 
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disagreed. But it is also plausible to argue that the majority in 
Seminole Tribe defended Hans not only as a matter of historical 
accuracy and stare decisis but also because it suited their preference 
for restricting the reach of federal power over the states. If the 
expansive Eleventh Amendment decisions in the Southern state bond 
cases were driven by fears of nonenforcement, that fear was surely 
absent in Seminole Tribe. The federal court could safely have ordered 
Florida to negotiate with the tribe “in good faith” (for whatever good 
that would do). 
V. MODERN CONSEQUENCES 
Because sovereign debts have come to be defined by their legal 
enforceability—or, rather, lack thereof—whether American state 
debts are “sovereign” depends on whether the creditors can secure an 
enforceable judgment in federal court. The U.S. Constitution does not 
by its terms generally preclude “suits against states”—quite the 
contrary. Instead, state suability depends (as we have seen) on exactly 
who is suing the state. The Eleventh Amendment and its associated 
doctrines bar the usual plaintiffs seeking to collect state debts: private 
investors both domestic and foreign. To that extent, American state 
debts are sovereign. But the Eleventh Amendment and associated 
doctrines do not bar all suits against states,69 not even all suits to 
collect state debts. Other American states have sued debtor states in 
federal court and won (and collected).70 And it has never been 
doubted that the federal government itself could sue states in federal 
court.71 Although states are immune from suit by most plaintiffs, state 
officers are not, if necessary to prevent violations of federal 
constitutional rights.72 But the sovereign immunity of states (such as it 
is) does not extend to their political subdivisions.73 Here the question 
is whether the governmental entity is more like a state or a county, a 
question that has proved difficult to answer with respect to some of 
 
 69.  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S 410, 420 n.19 (1979) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment has 
not accorded the States absolute sovereign immunity in federal-court actions.”). 
 70.  South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904). 
 71.  United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 
211 (1890); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (reaffirming United States v. Texas). 
 72.  See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 
n.14 (reaffirming Ex parte Young). 
 73.  See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); see also N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 
Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly refused to extend 
sovereign immunity to counties.”). 
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the modern commissions and authorities that states have created.74 
The scars of the struggle over the enforceability of state debts 
remain visible today, not only on the jurisdiction of federal courts, but 
also on the creditworthiness of Southern states. In North Carolina, for 
example, the state constitution adopted in 1971 carries forward a 
provision that the General Assembly “shall never . . . assume or pay 
any . . . bond . . . issued” between 1868 and 1870 unless payment is 
approved “by a majority of all of the qualified voters at a referendum 
held for that sole purpose.”75 Lest this embarrassment impair the 
state’s current credit rating, the same constitution gives investors in 
later issues extraordinary protection. Although the governor has the 
duty to maintain a balanced budget by “making necessary economies 
in State expenditures,” that duty is subject to the significant proviso 
that she must first make “adequate provision for the prompt payment 
of the principal of and interest on bonds and notes of the State 
according to their terms.”76 Modern bondholders, in other words, are 
first in line in case of a revenue shortfall, ahead of school children and 
the indigent—probably a necessary proviso in light of the state’s 
credit history, but one that the unreformed Ebenezer Scrooge would 
doubtless have applauded. 
 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that a principal factor in determining the sovereign status of a governmental entity is whether a 
judgment against the governmental entity would have to be paid from the state’s treasury). 
 75.  N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (4). The original version of this provision dates to a post-
Reconstruction amendment added to the state’s 1868 constitution in 1880 and carried over into 
the state’s 1971 constitution. See ORTH, supra note 41, at 123–24. 
 76.  N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5 (3). This provision, requiring a balanced budget, was added to 
the state’s 1971 constitution by amendment in 1977. ORTH, supra note 41, at 94–96. Lest this 
addition raise doubts about the inviolability of subsequently issued state debt, the provision 
expressly preserves the obligation of bonds or notes “issued hereafter.” N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5 
(3). The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that taxpayers have standing to challenge a 
governor’s actions under this subsection. Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 2006). In a 
later stage of the same case, the extent of the governor’s power to reallocate appropriated funds 
was clarified by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, a decision affirmed by an equally divided 
state supreme court. Goldston v. State, 683 S.E.2d 237 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 700 S.E.2d 
223 (N.C. 2010) (affirming the lower-court decision by a divided supreme court and without 
precedential value). 
 
